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Introduction
A “luxury tax,” or competitive balance tax, is a surcharge on the aggregate payroll of a
sports team that exceeds a predetermined limit set by the corresponding sports league.
The luxury tax was essentially designed to slow the growth of salaries and to prevent
large-market teams from signing all of the top players within a league. The money
derived from this tax is distributed among the financially weaker teams. The luxury
tax thus aims to create a more balanced league, because redistribution among clubs
counteracts financial imbalances.
In North America, the National Basketball Association (NBA) and Major League
Baseball (MLB) operate with a luxury tax system. In 1984, the NBA became the first
league to introduce salary cap provisions.1 The NBA’s salary cap is a so-called “soft
cap,” meaning that there are several exceptions that allow teams to exceed the salary
cap in order to sign players. These exceptions are mainly designed to enable teams to
retain popular players. In 1999, the NBA also introduced a luxury tax system for those
teams with an average team payroll exceeding the salary cap by a predefined amount.
These teams have to pay a 100% tax to the league for each dollar their payroll exceeds
the tax level.
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Abstract
This paper presents a model of a professional sports league and analyzes the effect of
luxury taxes on competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare. It shows that a
luxury tax increases aggregate salary payments in the league and produces a more bal-
anced league. Moreover, a higher tax rate increases the profits of large-market clubs,
whereas the profits of small-market clubs only increase if the tax rate is not set inad-
equately high. Finally, we show that social welfare increases with a luxury tax.
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The first luxury tax in professional sports was introduced in 1996 by MLB as part of
its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). This agreement imposed a luxury tax of
35% for the first two years and 34% for the third year on the teams with the top five
payrolls during the 1997, 1998, and 1999 seasons. Between 2000 and 2002, the luxury
tax system was replaced by a revenue-sharing system. MLB reintroduced a luxury tax
system in 2003 and set fixed limits on payrolls for every year. For instance, the limit was
$137 million in 2006, $148 million in 2007, and $155 million in 2008. The excess pay-
roll is taxed at 22.5% for first-time offenders, 30% for the second offense and 40% for
three or more offenses. Table 1 shows recent luxury tax payments in the NBA and MLB.
Table 1: Luxury Tax Payments in the NBA and MLB
Luxury Tax Payments (in US$)
League Club Season 2006-07 Season 2007-08
NBA New York Knicks 45’100’000 19’700’000
Dalas Mavericks 7’200’000 19’600’000
Cleveland Cavaliers - 14’000’000
Denver Nuggets 2’000’000 13’600’000
Miami Heat - 8’300’000
Boston Celtics - 8’200’000
Minnesota Timberwolves 1’000’000 -
LA Lakers - 5’100’000
Phoenix Suns - 3’900’000
San Antonio Spurs 200’000 -
League Club Season 2006 Season 2007
MLB New York Yankees 26’000’000 23’880’000
Boston Red Soxs 498’000 6’060’000
The welfare effect of luxury taxes has not yet been studied in the sports economic
literature. There are, however, some studies that analyze the effect of luxury taxes on
competitive balance and player salaries. Gustafson and Hadley (1996) find that a lux-
ury tax will depress the demand curve for star players on high-payroll teams and will
not alter the demand for star players by low-payroll teams, resulting in a lower equi-
librium salary for star players. The new equilibrium is further characterized by a high-
er level of competitive balance, because the high-payroll teams will hire fewer star
players and the low-payroll teams will hire more star players as compared to the peri-
od prior the introduction of the luxury tax.
Marburger (1997) develops a model with two profit-maximizing clubs, including
one large-market club and one small-market club, and a fixed talent supply. He shows
that luxury taxes that are uniformly imposed as a linear function of a club’s payroll and
that are not redistributed to other clubs do not affect club profitability because the
decline in salaries equals the increase in taxes. Luxury taxes that are redistributed
according to a linear subsidy function result in lower salaries and higher profits, but
they do not affect competitive balance. In order to reward small-market clubs and
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improve competitive balance, the proceeds of luxury taxes must be distributed uni-
formly among all clubs.
Ajilore and Hendrickson (2005) analyze the effect of luxury taxes on competitive
balance in MLB by empirically estimating the impact of luxury taxes on team compet-
itiveness. Their results show that the introduction of a luxury tax in MLB has reduced
the competitive inequality of teams. Most of their results, however, are driven by a sin-
gle team, the New York Yankees. Finally, Van der Burg and Prinz (2005) propose a pro-
gressive tax on either the revenues or the payroll of sports clubs as a means to enhance
competitive balance in team sports league. Their theoretical analysis shows that both
types of tax will create asymmetric changes in the marginal revenues or the marginal
costs of the clubs and thus yield a more balanced league.
In the present paper, we add to the literature by providing a welfare analysis of lux-
ury taxes in a professional team sports league. In particular, we analyze the effect of
luxury taxes on competitive balance, club profits, and social welfare. We show that a
luxury tax increases aggregate player salaries in the league and produces a more bal-
anced league. Moreover, a higher tax rate increases the profits of large-market clubs,
whereas the profits of small-market clubs only increase if the tax rate is not set inade-
quately high. Finally, we show that social welfare increases with a luxury tax.
Model
The following model describes the impact of luxury taxes on social welfare in a profes-
sional team sports league consisting of an even number of profit-maximizing clubs. The
league generates total revenues according to a league demand function. League revenues
are then split among the clubs that differ with respect to their market share. We assume
that there are two types of clubs, namely, large-market clubs and small-market clubs. In
order to maximize profits, each club independently invests in playing talent.
League demand depends on the quality of the league, q, and is derived as follows.2 We
assume a continuum of fans that differ in their willingness to pay for a league with qual-
ity q. Every fan k has a certain preference for quality that is measured by . The fans  
are assumed to be uniformly distributed in [0,1], that is, the measure of potential fans is
one. The net utility of fan is specified as . At price p, the fan that is
indifferent between consuming the league product or not is given by . Hence,
the measure of fans that purchase at price p is                          . The league demand func-
tion is therefore given by                            . Note that league demand increases in quali-
ty, albeit with a decreasing rate; that is,                   and                  . By normalizing all
other costs (e.g., stadium and broadcasting costs) to zero, league revenues are simply
. Then, the league will choose the profit-maximizing price               .3
Given this profit-maximizing price, league revenues depend solely on the quality of the
league as follows:
Following the sports economic literature (e.g., Szymanski, 2003), we assume that
league quality depends on the level of the competition as well as the potential suspense
associated with a close competition (competitive balance). Moreover, we assume that
the supply of talent is perfectly elastic. As a consequence, the unit cost/price of talent
is exogenously given and constant. Without loss of generality, we normalize the unit
cost/price of talent to one, which means that talent investments of club i, denoted by
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xi, are equal to their salary payments. In the subsequent analysis, we use the terms
“player salaries” and “talent investments” interchangeably.
The level of competition is measured by the aggregate talent within the n-club
league. We assume that the marginal effect of player salaries (talent investments)xi on
the level of the competition, T, is positive but decreasing: 
(1)
This is guaranteed in our model if                                            , and                    ,
which will always be satisfied in equilibrium.
Competitive balance, CB, is measured by minus the variance of player salaries and
yields:4
Note that a lower variance of player salaries among the n clubs implies closer com-
petition and, therefore, a higher degree of competitive balance. If all clubs invest the
same amount in talent, then the measure for competitive balance attains its maximum
and equals zero.
League quality is now defined as: 
with . The parameter m represents the relative weight that fans place on aggre-
gate talent and competitive balance. Given aggregate player salaries of the other (n-1)
clubs, league quality increases with club i’s player salaries xi until a
threshold value xi(m). Since fans have at least some preference for com-
petitive balance, excessive dominance by one club causes quality to decrease.
League revenues are split between the two types of clubs according to their market
shares. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that half of the n clubs are large-market
clubs which receive a bigger share of league revenues than the small-market clubs.5
Each of the large-market clubs receives a fraction      of league revenues, and each of
the small-market clubs receives a fraction       of  league revenues, with 
We denote Jl and Js as the set of large-market and small-market clubs, respectively,
i.e., .
Furthermore, our league features a luxury tax system with an endogenously deter-
mined luxury tax and subsidy.6 A club must pay a luxury tax if its player salaries lie
above the league’s average salary level. The club with player salaries below the league’s
average salary level then receives this tax as a subsidy. We model the endogenously
determined tax or subsidy, , as follows 
IJSF_5•1_IJSF_6x9_2  2/8/10  9:50 AM  Page 44
Volume 5 • Number 1 • 2010 • IJSF 45
The Effect of Luxury Taxes in Sports Leagues
where the parameter represents the tax rate. Note that if club i spends more
than the league’s average salary level, then this club has to pay a luxury tax, whereas it
receives a subsidy if it spends less than the average level in the league, i.e.,
. Moreover, note that the luxury tax or subsidy involves a pure
redistribution among clubs because                 .
The profit function                    of          club  is given by
(2)
with          for           and           for           .
Social welfare is given by the sum of the aggregate consumer (or fan) surplus, the
aggregate club profit and the aggregate player salaries. Aggregate consumer surplus,
CS, corresponds to the integral of the demand function, d(p,q), from the equilibrium
price               to the maximum price            , which is the maximum price fans are will-
ing to pay for quality q, that is, 
The summation of aggregate consumer surplus, aggregate club profits and aggregate
player salaries produces social welfare as 
Note that neither aggregate player salaries, taxes, nor subsidies directly influence
social welfare, because salaries merely represent a transfer from clubs to players, and
the tax or subsidy involves a pure redistribution among clubs.
As mentioned above, clubs are assumed to be profit-maximizing and thus, each club            
aims to solve the following maximization problem:7
.
The solution to the maximization problem is given in the next lemma:
Lemma 1 
The equilibrium player salaries (talent investments) for club          are given by 
(3)
with 
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The lemma shows that all large-market (small-market) clubs choose the same salary
level, xl (xs). Moreover, the large-market clubs spend more on player salaries than the
small-market clubs because the marginal revenue of talent investments is higher for
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the former type of clubs. As a consequence, each large-market club has to pay a luxu-
ry tax, and each small-market club receives a subsidy, which is financed by the large-
market clubs.
We see that a higher tax rate r induces small-market clubs to increase their talent
investments, i.e.,            . This result is intuitively clear: a higher tax rate increases the
subsidies to small-market clubs, which are financed by large-market clubs, such that
the investment costs of small-market clubs decrease.
The effect of a higher tax rate on the talent investments of large-market clubs, how-
ever, is ambiguous and depends on the fans’ preference parameter m. Note that 
with                       . A higher tax rate thus induces large-market clubs to increase their
investment level if fans have a high preference for competitive balance, i.e.,             ,
and to decrease their investment level if fans have a high preference for aggregate tal-
ent, i.e.,           .
The rationale for this result is as follows. If m is relatively low, fans have a high pref-
erence for competitive balance and the equilibrium (3) is already characterized by a
high level of competitive balance and a low level of aggregate talent. At these equilib-
rium levels, the marginal benefit of a higher level of aggregate talent, which translates
into higher revenues, is larger than the higher investment costs due to a higher tax. As
a consequence, large-market clubs will increase their investment level.
In contrast, if m is relatively high, the equilibrium is already characterized by a high
level of aggregate talent and a low level of competitive balance. In this case, the mar-
ginal benefit of a higher level of aggregate talent is small, and cannot compensate for
the higher investments costs, inducing the large-market clubs to decrease their invest-
ment level.
On aggregate, however, the investment level always increases with a higher tax rate.
That is, even if large-market clubs decrease their investments (i.e., if            ), they never
compensate for the increase of talent among small-market clubs.
The luxury tax paid by each large-market club,         , in equilibrium is given by
Meanwhile the subsidy received by each small-market club,          , is given by
Note that a higher tax rate, r, increases the subsidy,     , received by small-market
clubs and decreases the luxury tax,       , paid by large-market clubs until the maximum
and minimum, respectively, is reached for                  .
In equilibrium, the aggregate level of player salaries, S*(r), and competitive balance,
CB*(r), are given by 
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and 
We thus derive the following proposition.
Proposition 1
A higher tax rate increases the level of competition and produces a more balanced league.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
Remember that on aggregate, the investment level increases with a higher tax rate:
that is, the net effect of a higher tax rate is positive, and aggregate player salaries in the
league will increase, i.e.,                         . It follows that a higher level of aggregate play-
er salaries in the league translates through the talent function (1) into a higher level of
the competition, T*.
The proposition further shows that a higher tax rate produces a more balanced
league and, thus, increases competitive balance, i.e.,                      . The rationale for
this result is that a higher tax diminishes differences among clubs. That is, even if
large-market clubs increase their investment levels, small-market clubs will always
respond with even higher investment levels such that                         .
Since both the level of the competition, T*, and competitive balance, CB*, increase
through a higher tax rate, it is clear that league quality, as given by                                            ,
will also increase. A higher league quality will then result in higher league revenues, LR*. 
As a consequence, we are able to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 2
A higher tax rate increases social welfare in a team sports league comprised of profit-
maximizing clubs.
Proof: Straightforward and therefore omitted.
The proposition posits that the introduction of a luxury tax system that redistrib-
utes revenues from large-market clubs to small-market clubs increases social welfare
in a team sports league comprised of profit-maximizing clubs, and an elastic supply of
talent. Since a higher tax rate increases league quality, it will also increase social wel-
fare because welfare is directly proportional to league quality. Note that the result of
the proposition is independent of the fans’ preferences for aggregate talent and com-
petitive balance.
In the following proposition, we analyze the effect of a higher tax rate on club profits.
Proposition 3
A higher tax rate always increases the profits of large-market clubs, whereas the profits
of small-market clubs only increase until the profit maximum is reached for a tax rate
given by                     .
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
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This proposition posits that even though large-market clubs must subsidize small-
market clubs, the large-market clubs always benefit from a higher tax, whereas the
small-market clubs only benefit up to a certain tax level, r*. The rationale for this result
is as follows. On the revenue side, both clubs benefit from higher league revenues as a
result of a higher luxury tax. Large-market clubs, however, benefit from the higher
league revenues at an above-average rate because they receive a larger share of league
revenues. On the cost side, small-market clubs face higher investment costs due to
higher player salaries, while the investment costs for large-market clubs decrease
(increase) if fans have a high preference for aggregate talent (competitive balance). For
small-market clubs, the higher subsidies and higher revenues compensate for the high-
er player salaries only until the tax rate attains r*. For large-market clubs, however, the
higher revenues always compensate for the higher costs, and thus, profits increase with
a higher tax rate.
Conclusion
Luxury taxes are an important way to increase competitive balance in professional
sports leagues. In this paper, we analyze the effects of a luxury tax on competitive bal-
ance, club profits, and social welfare under the assumption that the supply of talent is
elastic and clubs maximize profits. We develop a game-theoretic model of an n-club
league consisting of small-market and large-market clubs and derive fan demand from
a general utility function by assuming that a fan’s willingness to pay depends on the
quality of the league. Our league features the combination of an endogenously deter-
mined luxury tax and subsidy. Clubs with payroll exceeding the average salary level
must pay a luxury tax on the excess amount. These proceeds are then redistributed
proportionally to those clubs with a payroll below the league average.
Our analysis shows that a higher luxury tax induces small-market clubs to increase
their player salaries. If fans have a high preference for aggregate talent, however, large-
market clubs will respond by decreasing their player salaries. Aggregate payrolls will
increase with a higher tax rate, as the increase in player salaries by small-market clubs
is always larger than the decrease in player salaries by large-market clubs. As a conse-
quence, both competitive balance and aggregate player salaries in the league will
increase. The effect of luxury taxes on social welfare is positive, because league quality
will always increase as a result of the combination of luxury taxes and its resulting sub-
sidies. Finally, our model shows that a luxury tax will increase the profits of large-mar-
ket clubs, whereas the profits of small-market clubs only increase if the tax rate is not
set inadequately high. This result holds despite the fact that large-market clubs must
finance the subsidies for small-market clubs.
Further research is necessary, for example, to model the bargaining game among
clubs and league authorities in the distribution of league revenues. Moreover, luxury
taxes have not yet been analyzed in the context of open league with promotion and rel-
egation, or so-called mixed leagues, that is, in leagues in which some clubs maximize
profits, while others aim to maximize wins.8 Finally, an interesting avenue for further
research is the analysis of luxury taxes in the context of a league with a fixed supply of
talent and an endogenously determined cost/price per unit of talent.
IJSF_5•1_IJSF_6x9_2  2/8/10  9:50 AM  Page 48
Volume 5 • Number 1 • 2010 • IJSF 49
The Effect of Luxury Taxes in Sports Leagues
References
Ajilore, O., & Hendrickson, J. (2005). The impact of the luxury tax on competitive balance in
Major League Baseball. IASE Working Paper Series, Paper No. 07-27. 
Buraimo, B., Forrest, D., & Simmons, R. (2007). Freedom of entry, market size, and competitive
outcome: Evidence from English soccer. Southern Economic Journal 74(1), 204-213.
Buraimo, B., & Simmons, R. (2008). Competitive balance and attendance in Major League
Baseball: An empirical test of the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis. International Journal
of Sport Finance 3, 146-155.
Dietl, H., Franck, E., & Lang, M. (2008). Overinvestment in team sports leagues: A contest the-
ory model. Scottish Journal of Political Economy 55, 353-368.
Dietl, H., & Lang, M. (2008). The effect of gate revenue sharing on social welfare. Contemporary
Economic Policy 26, 448.459. 
Dietl, H., Lang, M., & Rathke, A. (2009). The effect of salary caps in professional team sports on
social welfare. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 9, Article 17.
Dietl, H., Lang, M., & Werner, S. (2009). Social welfare in sports leagues with profit-maximizing
and/or win-maximizing clubs. Southern Economic Journal, 76, 375-396.
Falconieri, S., Palomino, F., & Sákovics, J. (2004). Collective versus individual sale of television
rights in league sports. Journal of the European Economic Association 5, 833-862.
Fort, R., & Quirk, J. (1995). Cross-subsidization, incentives, and outcomes in professional team
sports leagues. Journal of Economic Literature, 33, 1265-1299.
Fort, R., & Quirk, J. (2004). Owner objectives and competitive balance. Journal of Sports
Economics, 5, 20-32.
Frick, B., Prinz, J., & Winkelmann, K. (2003). Pay inequalities and team performance: Empirical
evidence from the North American major leagues. International Journal of Manpower, 24,
472-488.
Gustafson, E., & Hadley, L. (1996). The luxury tax proposal for Major League Baseball: A partial
equilibrium analysis. In J. Fizel, E. Gustafson, & L. Hadley (Eds.), Baseball economics: Current
research, pp. 145-159. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Hoehn, T., & Szymanski, S. (1999). The Americanization of European football. Economic Policy,
14, 204-240.
Humphreys, B. (2002). Alternative measures of competitive balance in sports leagues. Journal of
Sports Economics, 3(2), 133.
Késenne, S. (2000a). The impact of salary caps in professional team sports. Scottish Journal of
Political Economy, 47, 422-430.
Késenne, S. (2000b). Revenue sharing and competitive balance in professional team sports.
Journal of Sports Economics, 1, 56-65.
Késenne, S. (2007). The economic theory of professional team sports – An analytical treatment.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Marburger, D. (1997). Gate revenue sharing and luxury taxes in professional sports.
Contemporary Economic Policy, 15, 114-123.
Sloane, P. (1971). The economics of professional football: The football club as a utility maximiz-
er. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 17, 121-146.
Szymanski, S. (2003). The economic design of sporting contests. Journal of Economic Literature,
41, 1137-1187.
Van der Burg, T., & Prinz, A. (2005). Progressive taxation as a means for improving competitive
balance. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 52, 65-74.
Vrooman, J. (1995). A general theory of professional sports leagues. Southern Economic Journal,
61, 971-990.
Vrooman, J. (2000). The economics of American sports leagues. Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, 47, 364-398.
IJSF_5•1_IJSF_6x9_2  2/8/10  9:50 AM  Page 49
50 Volume 5 • Number 1 • 2010 • IJSF
Dietl, Lang, Werner
Endnotes
1 A salary cap is a limit on the amount of money a club can spend on player salaries. The cap is
usually defined as a percentage of average annual revenues and limits a club’s investment in play-
ing talent. For a more detailed analysis, see e.g., Fort and Quirk (1995), Késenne (2000a),
Szymanski (2003), Vrooman (1995, 2000), and Dietl, Lang, and Rathke (2009).
2 Our approach is similar to Falconieri et al. (2004), but we use a different quality function. The
quality function q in Falconieri et al. always increases with a club’s own talent investments, i.e.,
, regardless of how unbalanced the league becomes. In contrast, in our model, quali-
ty decreases if the league becomes too unbalanced. Also see Dietl and Lang (2008) who derive
league demand as in the present paper.
3 Note that the optimal price increase with quality, i.e., 
4 For an analysis of competitive balance in sports leagues, see e.g., Humphreys (2002), Buraimo
et al. (2007), and Buraimo and Simmons (2008). Moreover, see Frick et al. (2003), who investi-
gate the consequences of wage disparities on team performance.
5An interesting avenue for further research is to generalize the results by implementing a param-
eter that characterizes the fraction of large-market and small-market clubs, respectively.
6 See also Marburger (1997).
7 For a discussion of the club objective function, see e.g., Sloane (1971), Hoehn and Szymanski
(1999), Fort and Quirk (2004), Késenne (2000b, 2007), and Dietl, Lang, and Werner (2009).
8 See, e.g., Dietl, Franck, and Lang (2008), who investigate the overinvestment problem in open
leagues and Dietl, Lang, and Werner (2009), who analyze social welfare in mixed leagues.
9 It is easy to show that the corresponding second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied.
10 This parameterization allows us to derive closed-form solutions. The results remain qualita-
tively the same for other parameter configurations.
Authors’ Note
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Swiss National
Science Foundation (Grants Nos. 100012-105270 and 100014-120503) and the
research fund of the University of Zurich.
Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The first-order conditions of equation (2) are given by9
if                       , and 
if                             . Note that          for          and              for           . Solving the sys-
tem of first-order conditions yields the following equilibrium investment levels:
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with,                                                                                                                             
.
In order to guarantee positive equilibrium investments, we assume that a is suffi-
ciently large. Moreover, in order to guarantee that large-market clubs always invest
more than small-market clubs, we assume that                                 .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
First, we prove that a higher tax rate increases the level of competition. Substituting
the equilibrium talent investments (3) in the talent function, T, given by (1) and com-
puting the derivative with respect to r yields
We derive that                                                                                                        .  
Second, we show that competitive balance increases with a higher tax rate. We find
that 
Since                , it holds that                     , which completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In order to analyze the effect of a luxury tax on club profits, we consider a two-club
league with n = 2 and set the fan preference parameter to m = 1/2.10 Substituting the
equilibrium talent investments (3) into the profit function (2) and maximizing it with
respect to the tax rate, r, yields the following profit-maximizing tax rate for large-mar-
ket clubs
and for small-market clubs
We can show that            , i.e., that the maximum profit for large-market clubs is not
within the interval of feasible tax rates. As a consequence, profits for large-market
clubs increase for all               . In contrast, for small-market clubs, the profit-maximiz-
ing tax rate,          , is in the interval (0,1]. It follows that the profits of small-market
clubs increase when           and decrease when          .
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